C.S. Lewis and Conscience

Monday, 07-24-2023

 

Query:

One of the assigned readings for an introductory theology class I plan to teach is a discussion of C.S. Lewis in relation to Freud.  The most obvious point of contrast is conscience, which for Freud is nothing but an inhibitory agency resulting from repression and the internalization of outside influences.  Lewis disagrees.  Like you, or for that matter any Thomist, Lewis thinks conscience imparts real knowledge.  However, his view also seems different from yours.  Sometimes he seems more like a Scottish moral sense thinker, because he thinks the feeling of remorse after committing an immoral act indicates a transgression of the Tao.  Then again, at other times he seems sort of Kantian, because he relies on first principles.  Sometimes he even seems quasi-utilitarian, because he relates acts to the goods they intend.  And – this is a big one -- he doesn’t talk about teleology, as you and other natural law thinkers do.

I haven’t read enough of Lewis to be sure, but do you think what I’ve said is correct?  I’m hoping that your Thomistic account might serve as a helpful corrective and contrast.

 

Reply:

Thanks for writing.  Lewis is brilliant, but I can see why all this seems a scramble to you, because there are several issues to be untangled.  The remarks I am about to make are based on his remarks about moral law in Mere Christianity, and his remarks about the Tao – his term for the natural norms of life for human beings -- in The Abolition of ManSo if you want to read more Lewis, that’s where to go.

Let’s begin with teleology.  I don’t think the fact that Lewis doesn’t talk about it explicitly implies that he doesn’t believe in it.  To me it seems that teleology is implicit in his account of what he calls the Tao, because he thinks we have knowledge of the Tao to the end that we be properly human.  Teleology is presupposed in other parts of his account too.  Birds raise their chicks to the end that they develop into good birds; good teachers teach literature to the end that their students develop sound responses to things.

Another reason Lewis doesn’t mention teleology explicitly is that, just as that other book of his discusses “mere Christianity,” so in The Abolition of Man he tries to present something we might call “mere natural law” (a phrase picked up recently as the title of a book by Hadley Arkes).  Lewis is trying to avoid the philosophical apparatus of the various different theories of natural law in order to sharpen our awareness of the underlying facts of experience which the theories are trying to explain.  In fact, this is why he borrows the term “Tao,” which means simply “the Way.”  He’s not an eastern Taoist (far from it), but he thinks that in the West the term “natural law” has acquired so much baggage that people can’t respond without knee-jerk reactions.

Having said that, I should add that I’m not sure his approach really is “mere.”  Just as his “mere” Christianity is not really neutral among all the various Christian theologies, so his “mere” natural law is not really neutral among all the various theories of natural law.  But his approach has the advantage of pushing our noses in the moral facts, so to speak, and keeping us from getting hung up in such technicalities as what this or that thinker might have said.  The important thing is not who said something or how he said it, but whether it was true.

A third reason he doesn’t mention teleology explicitly is that in Lewis’s day, the view was still dominant among analytical philosophers that you can’t get an ought from an is -- that descriptive premises can’t entail evaluative conclusions -- and that thinking that they can is a fallacy.  If doing so really is a fallacy, then it would seem that natural law theory is impossible, because it is based on the facts of our nature.  Although Lewis doesn’t challenge the view that is-to-ought inferences are fallacies, he seems to be looking for a way of talking about the natural law which bypasses them.  Whether or not he thinks that he has bypassed them, he hasn’t, for he thinks that in a certain sense the Tao just is our nature, as mature oakhood just is the nature of the acorn.  He therefore reasons that from the fact of the Tao there follows the evaluative conclusion that a sound human being is one who stands within it.

As it happens, analytical philosophy has retreated from the idea that is-to-ought inferences are fallacious anyway.  It would be pretty silly to deny that from the facts that my eyes are for seeing and that they don’t see clearly (a pair of descriptive premises), it follows that they are bad eyes and need correction (a pair of evaluative conclusions).  Actually the people who still believe the so-called fallacy to be a fallacy are hoist by their own petard, because they think that from the descriptive premise that we can’t get an ought from an is, there follows the evaluative conclusion that trying to derive one is bad reasoning.

I don’t see anything utilitarian or “quasi” utilitarian about Lewis’s account.  Perhaps he looks a bit utilitarian to you because utilitarians talk about pursuing goods, and Lewis does think there are real goods which ought to be pursued.  But one doesn’t have to be a utilitarian to believe that.  For example, Thomas Aquinas, who is no utilitarian, presents the pursuit of good and the avoidance of evil as the bedrock of all moral reasoning.  What is distinctive about a utilitarian isn’t that he pursues goods, but that he denies that there are any intrinsically evil acts, so he thinks that for a good enough outcome, anything whatsoever may be done.  Lewis doesn’t believe this any more than Thomas Aquinas does.

I don’t see anything particularly Kantian about Lewis’s account either, since everyone consciously or unconsciously relies on first principles.  Thomas Aquinas plainly does, although he doesn’t call the body of first principles the Tao.  Perhaps Lewis looks a bit Kantian to you because Lewis believes the Tao includes the Golden Rule, and the Golden Rule is a close cousin of Kant’s Categorical Imperative.  But what is distinctive about a Kantian isn’t that he believes something like the Golden Rule, but that he believes that it is the only principle there is.  Neither Lewis nor Thomas Aquinas thinks it is the only one.  Consider:  In order to do unto others as I would have them do unto me, I must first know what I ought to want them to do unto me.  If I were a masochist who wanted others to give me pain, then reasoning “Do as I would wish to be done by” would lead me to conclude that I should give others pain.  The Golden Rule is the keystone of the arch, but it isn’t the whole arch.

As for moral sense theorists.  I am all for trying to present the natural law in a way that appeals to the common moral sense of the plain person.  That’s what I tried to do in What We Can’t Not Know: A GuideHowever, there is a big problem in deciding whether someone does or doesn’t think like a Scottish moral sense theorist, because the expression “moral sense theory” is ambiguous.  Some of the writers called moral sense theorists are given the name because they view right and wrong as something we feel, as we feel emotions.  Sometimes they are given it because they view right and wrong as something that we “sense,” as we sense light and darkness.  And sometimes they are given it because they view right and wrong as something that we perceive with the mind, in a manner which may not be identical with sense perception, but which is at least loosely analogous to it.

Where is Lewis in all that?  He thinks morality is something perceived by the mind with the assistance of properly cultivated emotions.  Whether that is a moral sense theory depends, I guess, on how you define moral sense theory, or which moral sense thinker you have in mind.  I don’t think the label helps.

As for conscience.  Today we often fail to distinguish between conscience itself -- which, as you mention, concerns the knowledge that something is wrong -- and remorse -- which concerns the painful feelings we have when we recognize having done something wrong.  Lewis recognizes that these are different things:  I can know that something is wrong and not feel bad about having done it, and I can perversely feel bad about having done it even though it was right.  On the other hand, he also recognizes that in a well-ordered soul, well-trained feelings cooperate with the mind.  For example, although feelings of disgust, disquiet, or remorse can be mistaken, they are also helpful data, arousing the mind to investigate whether something is really wrong.

Finally, back to teleology.  I like to say that natural law theories of the classical type – by which I mean “thick” natural law theories, not “thin” ones like we find in, say, the Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes -- weave together four different sources of natural moral knowledge, four different “witnesses” to moral truth.  One is deep conscience; another is the designedness of things in general; the third is the details of our own design; and the last is the witness of the natural consequences of our deeds.  Now the second and third witnesses are obviously about teleology.  But the first and fourth witnesses presuppose teleology, because unless conscience is designed to impart the truth, its voice is a meaningless noise -- and unless we are designed to live in a certain way, the consequences of our actions “just happen.”

One doesn’t have to blow a teleology trumpet to talk about these things.  One can just talk about them.  I think Lewis is that kind of moral apologist.

Does this help?

 

 

Three and a Half Minutes on the Study of Self-Deception

Thursday, 07-20-2023

 

Hear me talking for three and a half minutes about The study of self-deception on the Catholic Culture Podcast.  (Interviewer Thomas V. Mirus.)

 

 

Why I Think Our Form of Social Order Can’t Last Much Longer

Monday, 07-17-2023

 

The more complex our social arrangements are, the more effort is needed to keep them running.  This belonged to the common sense of social life long before it was codified in physics as the Second Law of Thermodynamics.  Living creatures die; so do cities, nations, and civilizations. 

The principle is true even when our social arrangements harmonize with the inclinations of our nature.  For example, human nature is made with a view to marriage, friendship, and family life.  We seek them, and we go to great lengths to maintain them.  Even so, all sorts of things can go wrong with them.  Marriages may unravel.  Friends may fall out.  Family members may become estranged.

But the principle is especially true when our arrangements are contrary to the inclinations of our nature, and we are trying to compensate for the tension.  To give but a single example, this is why socialism has never worked.  People are not utterly selfish, but neither are they entirely unselfish, especially toward strangers.  As G.K. Chesterton remarked, utopian schemes “take the greatest difficulty of man and assume it to be overcome, and then give an elaborate account of the overcoming of the smaller ones.  They first assume that no man will want more than his share, and then are very ingenious in explaining whether his share will be delivered by motor-car or balloon.”

One would expect the tendency to disorder to be greatest when social arrangements are both increasingly complicated, and increasingly unnatural.  Hackers couldn’t have kept our ancestors from building cooking fires, but it is very difficult to keep them from knocking out the electrical grid.   Men and women are able to get along reasonably well when their mutual expectations are in line with what they are really like, but when they aren’t, the war between the sexes passes from playful metaphor to dread reality.

Unfortunately, the way we “fix” broken complicated systems today is to invent control systems, and the way we fix those is to invent controls on the controls, ad infinitum.  Consider record keeping.  When all information was on paper, it was pretty easy to lock it up.  Now that information is on increasingly interconnected and permeable computer systems, employees have to be rigorously trained to keep the smoke from leaking out of the bottle of data.  In recent years, as a university professor, I’ve been required to take ten short courses on various aspects of information security, the most recent of which had eight modules.

That’s not to mention a total of nine other courses mandated for all university employees, in things like workplace discrimination and harassment, ethics and “compliance,” “staying healthy in a changing environment,” and something called “social engineering,” which I can’t remember.

None of this was required when I began teaching.  The controllers consider the change progress.  Eventually we will spend more time on required training than on doing our job.  And yet I don’t think we are behaving any better.

Now think of just a few of the other kinds of smoke that have to be kept in their bottles.  Manufactured viruses, both biological and electronic.  Artificial intelligence.  Terrorists.  Genetic modification.  The ideological transformation of education.  Connecting computer chips to the nervous system.  New kinds of social malcontents.  Universal, ubiquitous surveillance.  The weaponization of the justice system.  Addictive media.  Identity thieves.  Vandals and thugs in low places and high.  These things are not like everyday disorder.

I am not preaching gloom and doom.  To say that the present order of things can’t last much longer is not to say that we can do nothing about how disruptively its passing takes place, or what replaces it.  But it is going to pass away.

You know what happens to a house of cards when the air in the room is disturbed.  The breeze is picking up.

 

Suspension

Monday, 07-10-2023

 

Recently, as we were visiting his church out of town, an acquaintance who works hard to bring in the sheaves greeted me and my wife with the friendly remark, "I like people who believe in something."  I wondered:  Do the people we casually describe as believing nothing literally believe nothing?  Or do they believe something after all?

The usual view is that regarding both particular beliefs and belief in general, a person either believes something, disbelieves it, or suspends judgment.  I think this way of viewing the matter is too simple.  Regarding belief, people act out commitment and  belonging in at least four different ways.

The first way is alethic commitment:  Committing and belonging because of considered belief that a thing is true.

The second is social commitment:  Committing and belonging because of a sheer need to commit and belong, simply taking for granted that the thing must be true.

The third is conformity:  Acting in a way that simulates commitment and belonging, not disbelieving the thing, but never really considering whether it is true.

The fourth is cynicism:  Acting in a way that simulates commitment and belonging, even though believing the thing untrue, just because one has something to gain.  For example, one may strike a religious pose among Christians, or an atheist pose among atheists, in order to “get along.”

To some extent, these four categories bleed into each other and are confused with each other.

Alethic belief bleeds into social belief, because we are social beings who cannot help but be influenced by each other.  This is why it is more important to have the right peers than to attempt an impossible immunity to peer pressure. 

Social belief blends into conformity, because we are careless beings who often live half-asleep.  This is why it is so important to inspect our thought processes, even at some risk of confusion.  

Conformity bleeds into cynicism, because we are intellectual beings who cannot remain in suspension between belief and disbelief.  As William James wrote, the mind operates with the attitude, “better face the enemy than the eternal Void!”  Even the so-called agnostic, who is says he “just doesn’t know” whether, for instance, Jesus is the Son of God, is practically committed to living either as though He is, or as though He isn’t.  Every way of living is some way of living.

In fact, universal doubt is impossible, because even when we doubt something, we doubt it for the sake of something we are less in doubt about.  I doubt that the shiny substance in my hand is diamond, because I can scratch it with a piece of steel, and I am not in doubt about the fact that diamond is harder than steel.  Since every doubt in P supposes confidence in Q, we can doubt anything in particular, but we cannot doubt everything at once.

Besides, no one would cynically simulate belief in something he disbelieved, unless, for some reason, he thought his advantage lay in “getting along” – which is, in itself, a belief.  Why doesn’t he doubt that belief?  In this sense even unprincipled people have principles, but bad ones.

Back to my priestly friend, who likes people who believe in something.  I don’t think he really meant to imply with his remark a person could believe nothing at all.  But he daily contends with the thoughtless common habit of allowing trivial and unreasonable beliefs to crowd out questions about things which are not only more important, but ultimately even more reasonable.  For the care of souls, he was looking for solutions.

Everyone believes in something, and whatever he believes, he believes it for the sake of something.  The question is what.

 

 

 

Eight Minutes on Why Stoicism Won’t Make You Happy

Friday, 07-07-2023

 

Hear me talking for eight minutes about Why Stoicism won't make you happy on the Catholic Culture Podcast.  (Interviewer Thomas V. Mirus.)

 

Elites, Deplorables, and Political Style

Monday, 07-03-2023

 

Allow me to update a post I wrote in 2020 about Donald Trump and social class, because the topic is broader than Trump.  Let me begin with what I said then. 

There is a lot to dislike about him.  Mr. Trump was a sneerer, mocker, boaster, and person of bad character -- and he still is.  But then-president Obama, and his then-vice president, Joe Biden, were are also sneerers, mockers, boasters, and persons of bad character.  “Why is the reaction to them so different?”  I asked.  The political classes adored Mr. Obama, liked Mr. Biden just fine, and still put up with Biden despite his obvious dementia, corruption, and incompetence.  By contrast, they despised Trump so intensely that they were willing to pull down the republic to get rid of him.  The instrumentalities of justice were weaponized against him.  Their entertainers openly made jokes about assassinating him.  The war shows no sign of ending; new assaults are launched daily.

Of course part of the difference in the reaction to these politicians is ideological.  Biden, like Obama before him, does things the political classes love, like promoting abortion, removing rules that protect the consciences of medical workers, distributing patronage to industries the political classes like, and expanding the regulatory apparatus.  By contrast, Trump appointed pro-life judges and did other things that they hate.

But that explains only part of it.  The political classes didn’t cast a hold-your-nose vote for Obama, or even for Biden; they didn’t put up with them despite their personality, vices, or bad manners.  They admired them for these qualities.  Biden has become embarrassing to them, but not because of his crudity.

I suggested in 2020 that “it’s a class thing.”   A certain kind of oafishness is considered lovable by the political classes, and not even recognized as oafish because it is their sort of oafishness.  Another kind of oafishness is considered lovable by those whom they disdain.  Obama was a smooth rich fellow who flattered the elites.  Biden is a coarse rich fellow who sneers at the common people in the same breath as he boasts of his humble origins.  The elites think this kind of talk is merely telling it like it is.

Trump is a coarse rich fellow who flatters the common people.  Since he sneers at the elites and adopts a popular tone in doing so, it enrages them.  Though all of these rulers claim to look out for the “little guy,” the difference is that Obama and Biden styled themselves as their patrons, and viewed the “little guys” as their clients.  Trump styles himself as their benefactor, and views them as his constituents.

Some people react viscerally to one kind of oafishness, some to the other.  Very little of the reaction is about the respective vices of these politicians, though much could be said about them.  Most of it is about the respective styles of their vices.  It is very hard to wipe the smear of class from the window of judgment to see clearly.

So much I wrote then.  But there is more to say, because the “class thing” is much bigger than Donald Trump.  Let’s put it in context.

The same people who used to love the Republican and despise the Democratic Party have now flipped, for the wealthy and professional classes used to be mostly Republicans; today they are mostly Democrats.  The biggest change is that “old money” doesn’t count for much any more, because the power has shifted to new money, high-tech money.  Progressivism, understood as the ideal of rule by managerial elites who “know better,” has doubled down.  Contempt for the blue collar and middle white collar classes, otherwise known as the “deplorables,” has intensified.  People can be arrested for peacefully complaining at school board meetings, or surveilled for being religious.

Several facts have obscured the reversal in the parties’ roles.  One is that although the Democratic Party is now the party of the privileged, it still positions itself rhetorically as the defender of the marginalized.  This, despite the fact that the actual effect of its policies is to increase economic dependence rather than reduce it, establishing all sorts of classes and underclasses of governmental clients.  The second is that it retains the support of the most powerful unions, although these are no longer trade or industrial unions.  The baton has now shifted to public employee unions – who strive to make their employer still bigger, and whose officers fully accept the managerial ethos.

There is no longer any place in the Democratic Party for the deplorables to go.  However, the Republican Party bosses adhere to a milder version of the same progressive ideology that the Democrats accept.  So the deplorables have no home there either.

No wonder the deplorables are resentful.  And no wonder so many of them still admire Mr. Trump.  It’s not that they like thugs.  But if they have to be ruled by them, they would rather be ruled by their own thugs.

 

 

What’s Happenin’ Now

Monday, 06-26-2023

 

For your perusal, a compilation of the latest tidbits from the newspaper of what’s happenin’ now.

Self:  Actually, it is all about me.

Reality:  Thinking and saying it make it so.

Truth:  See Reality.

Sex:  Okay if it doesn’t hurt anyone.  Never hurts anyone.

Existence of God:  Doesn’t matter anyway.

Good:  What I want.

Evil, meaning 1:  What I don’t want.  Must not be done.

Evil, meaning 2:  What you don’t want.  May be done for good.  See Good.

Rights:  I get to do what I want.

Duties:  You have to let me do what I want.

Wisdom:  Knowing how to get what I want.

Justice, meaning 1:  Abolishing police. 

Justice, meaning 2:  Punishing political opponents.

Justice, meaning 3:  See Duties.

Privilege:  What I should have and you shouldn’t.

Equity:  See Privilege.

Violence:  Mostly peaceful, when committed in my cause.

Racism:  Thinking every race should be treated the same.

Voting Rights:  What dead people have in elections.

Promises:  Meaningless words that sound meaningful.

Commitment:  Not being married.

Love:  Sexual desire.

Family:  Any group of people whatsoever.

Matrimony:  Any group of people whatsoever, but with sex.

Children:  Lifestyle additions, like flatscreen TVs.

Day Care:  The golden key to childhood development.

Mothers:  Ought to be working.

Fathers:  Are dispensable.

Parents:  Need supervision by villages.

Boys:  Ought to be more like girls.

Girls:  Better version of boys.

Gender:  Whatever I want you to call me.

Women:  Some have penises, some don’t.

Men:  See Women.

Respect:   Saying what I tell you to say.

Affirmation:  See Respect.

Virtue:  Signaling that you hold the currently approved opinions.

Extremist:  Someone not holding the currently approved opinions.

Disruptive:  See Extremist.

Intolerant:  See Disruptive.

Artificial intelligence:  Soon to be the only kind.

See also:

Newspeak Dictionary

Doubleplusgood Ducktalkers

Politics and Language, Revisited

Our (Non) Racist and (Non) Sexist Constitution

So Called Inclusive Language