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Beauty, Sublimity, and NeedinessMonday, 03-10-2025
Query:I was part of the virtual meeting you had with my high school’s Philosophy Club, and I was very taken with your remarks about the difference between beauty and sublimity. Could you say a little more about that?
Reply:Well, I’m not an expert on aesthetics, but sure, I’ll do the best I can! I think it was in the 1700s that people who thought about art and literature became fascinated by the fact that beauty doesn’t exhaust the range of aesthetic values. The kind of thing which is properly called beautiful, or lovely, or pretty, stirs a certain kind of pleased admiration, as a rose does. It gives rise to this delight because of its grace of form and color. But the kind of thing which is properly called sublime stirs awe, as the North Face of Mt. Everest does. We tremble, because of its vastness or mystery. It’s possible for the same thing to be both beautiful and sublime, just as the same thing can be both big and green. But beauty and sublimity are different qualities, as bigness and greenness are different qualities. So an object can be beautiful without being sublime, and it can be sublime without being beautiful. The writer Coleridge relates an anecdote about two tourists whom he overheard viewing a great waterfall. One tourist called it “sublime,” but the other called it “pretty.” Coleridge inwardly agreed with former tourist, but he was revolted by the judgment of the latter tourist. In fact, these two qualities are so different that an object which is sublime may sometimes include elements of the jarring or grotesque, even though, in themselves, these are opposed to beauty. A painting of the crucifixion in which Jesus doesn’t seem to suffer might please us in the way beautiful things do, but would probably not be viewed as sublime. A painting in which stuns us by the vividness with which it conveys His pain and suffering might excite awe and be viewed as sublime, but would probably not be viewed as beautiful. Needless to say, in everyday speech people throw these words around in slangy, comical, or figurative ways, and that’s okay. When the hero of the movie finally turns the tables on the bad guy, I might clap and cry out, “beautiful!” When someone serves us an incomparably scrumptious piece of chocolate cake, I might delightedly exclaim, “sublime!” This is like my calling it a “miracle” when I manage to balance my checkbook. Does this help?
Her reply:Thank you! Honestly, I didn’t have clear definitions until now. I still don’t quite understand how something can be both beautiful and sublime, though. Could you elaborate? Also, why do we find different things beautiful? Is there a gift of aesthetic judgment? And does art have to be beautiful?
My further response:As to how something could ever be both beautiful and sublime: Beauty and sublimity are very different, yes, but they don’t absolutely exclude each other. For example, quite a bit of religious art has both qualities. Consider the Madonna and Child painting by Bouguereau called The Virgin and the Lilies. It’s pleasing color and form give it beauty, but the gravity of the faces and the holiness of the Child’s blessing inspire awe, which gives it sublimity. Or consider Michelangelo’s Pieta. Mary, in unfathomable grief, is holding her dead Son. One is struck with awe by the stillness of her face and by the suggestion of a vastly greater secret than mere mortality. Yet the arrangement is perfectly balanced and beautiful. Believers like me consider God Himself both beautiful and sublime. St. Augustine of Hippo wrote in awe, “Question the beautiful earth; question the beautiful sea; question the beautiful air, diffused and spread abroad; question the beautiful heavens; question the arrangement of the constellations; question the sun brightening the day by its effulgence; question the moon, tempering by its splendor the darkness of the ensuing night; question the living creatures that move about in the water, those that remain on land, and those that flit through the air, their souls hidden but their bodies in view, visible things which are to be ruled and invisible spirits doing the ruling; question all these things and all will answer: 'Behold and see! We are beautiful.' Their beauty is their confession. Who made these beautiful transitory things unless it be the unchanging Beauty?” Now all those transitory things are beautiful – but the unchanging Beauty who made them is also sublime. As to why we don’t all find the same things beautiful: I think there are at least three reasons (maybe lots more). One is that we have unequal ability to recognize beauty when we see it, and someone whose appreciation of beauty is blunt, inexperienced, or still developing, may be able to recognize some kinds of beauty more easily than others. A child will be drawn to bright colors: “How pretty!” But a grownup, while appreciating what the child appreciates, may be more attracted to a subtle interplay of hue and shadow. A second reason is that even among people who are equally sensitive to beauty, one person’s “antennae” may be tuned more closely to one kind of beauty, and another’s to another kind. Amazingly, this difference adds to the delight, because each person can help the other person to see what he sees! A third reason is that some people are attracted to things that aren’t beautiful, but call them beautiful, just because they are attracted to them. More about that below. As to whether we have a gift of aesthetic judgment: Yes, I would call it a gift. Aesthetic perception enables us to see in things qualities that no animal can see. It elevates us to the consideration of things beyond food and drink. We didn’t give it to ourselves; it is a gratuitous gift to the human race from our Creator. As to whether art has to be beautiful: Here let me borrow from something I posted to my blog in 2019. If by art we mean any object that we value for reasons other than its usefulness, then there is no telling what people may call “art.” Even beauty and sublimity are far from the only qualities that people look for. I am not here thinking of attractions which can be separated from the work, such as how much its great expense will delight my friends, or how well its color scheme blends in with the rest of my decor. Rather I am thinking of attractions which are intrinsic to the work, which it would possess even if it I had picked it up cheap at a garage sale and it looked out of place in my house. For example, a work of art might be neither beautiful nor sublime, but intriguing. It might be none of these things, but a faithful representation of its object. It might call my attention to something I had not thought of before. It might add variety and interest to a structural feature of a building. It might catch the eye, or even fool the eye as in the form of illusion called trompe-l'œi, like this painting by del Caso. It might suggest an episode in a story, or convey a lesson. It might symbolize a concept. It might excite admiration because of the labor which went into its composition. It might evoke a mood, such as boredom, a philosophy, such as nihilism, or a psychological state, such as obsession. It might call up a whisper of memory or longing. It might calm or excite the beholder. It might challenge, comfort, or irritate. It might build up, or it might inflict damage and harm. It might signal that the maker holds one of the currently fashionable views (or, more rarely, that he doesn’t). It might do nothing more than express his attitude toward himself, other people, God, or the viewer -- in the manner of a joke, a prayer, a sob, a sin, or a curse. Such qualities have always been present in art. The difference is that in our day they have migrated to the center of the enterprise. Mind you, though I could do without some of them, I am not at the moment passing judgment on all of them, only pointing them out. I am not one of those who hate all modernist art, though much of it leaves me cold. It is often interesting -- even though it is not often what I would call beautiful. Or, for that matter, sublime.
Her reply:Last question for now! In our Philosophy Club meeting, a lot of questions about God came up too, just like in your comments just now. You mentioned that God is utterly complete, with no unfulfilled potentiality. Since God is already fulfilled, why does He desire to have a relationship with us? Aren’t desires born out of need or lack?
My further response:Have you noticed how strongly people want to think that God is needy? Quite a few people think He must have created us out of loneliness. A widely quoted poem begins, “And God stepped out on space, and he looked around and said: I’m lonely -- I’ll make me a world.” But God doesn’t need us. We Human beings are lonely because of deficiency, especially in relation to God, from whom we are alienated by sin. But God is deficient in nothing. He did not create us because He needed us; He created us from sheer love. Perhaps our problem is that we think of love itself as the result of deficiency: I love, because I need someone. If Divine love were like that, then Divinity would incapable of love. This is why Aristotle considers it ridiculous to think that God could have friendship with man. He thinks of God as “thought thinking itself,” revolving around itself in utter indifference to humans and their affairs. Then again, perhaps the reluctance to believe that God doesn’t need anything arises from a desire to put God in our debt. The asymmetry of our relation to Him perturbs us; we want Him to depend on us, as we depend on Him. Irrationally, we are more confident if we think He needs something from us – if we think we can make Him unhappy by withholding it -- than if it is His very nature to love. This delusion makes us think that we can bargain with Him. In Christian tradition, which is my own tradition, Divine love isn’t like that, because it proceeds not from deficiency but from utter fullness. St. John doesn’t just write that God loves, but that God is love. He is One God, yes, but this One is a burning unity of three Divine Persons united in love. Thus it pertains to His very being to love, and it pertains to Him not because of need or compulsion, but freely, as gift. Charity is the stupendous, supernaturally infused virtue by which a human being becomes capable of loving like that, by sharing in the Divine life. Yet according to the same faith, the most stupendous act of Divine love is that the Second Person of the Trinity, by His nature lacking nothing and incapable of pain, joined Himself to the weakness of our own human nature. He took the burden of our suffering upon Himself, even the suffering of our alienation from Him. Identifying completely with us, He deliberately exposed Himself to death by torture, so that if we are in turn identified with Him, then everything in us that needs to die can also die, and we can be resurrected with Him. A God who lacks something is not much of a God. But a God who freely joins Himself to our suffering, just because of the fullness of His love for us, is worthy of the highest worship.
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A Trove of Underground ThomisticaThursday, 03-06-2025
Gentle readers: Good news. Some time ago I mentioned that on the Read Articles page of this website, some of the articles had become unavailable because the magazine in which they were originally published was migrating to a new server and changing all the previous URLs. I promised to keep you posted. As it turned out, the articles remained unavailable even after the migration was finished, because now they were behind a paywall. Not only that, but a lot of links to my publications in other journals and websites were broken too. Disappointing. The good news is that I've got the links to all 65 of the articles on the Read Articles page functional again. It’s like having a whole new library of Underground Thomistica.
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Did God Create Logic?Monday, 03-03-2025
Query:Did God create logic? How can God be bound by order when He is the creator of it? Some people say God maintains His position as the creator of the universal order because He created logic. But He must have a system by which he “thinks” -- even if it’s a different logic than ours -- so it seems that God’s logic must be prior to His thinking. In that case, He would need to have a logic already in order to create one! How can I make sense of this tangle? Please let me know what you think!
Reply:Good questions. Let me suggest several converging ways to think about the matter. God, suggests Thomas Aquinas, can do everything which is “absolutely” possible – everything which doesn’t involve contradiction. To say that He created logic would be to suggest that He could have done differently and created illogic – that He could have allowed contradictions such as a man who is a donkey, or a two which is a three. But if I make a sentence by placing the words “God can” before a string of nonsense, that doesn’t make the sentence true, would it? Sentences like “Can God make a man who is not a man but a donkey?” or “Can God make a two which is a three?” wouldn’t even rise to the level of being meaningful questions. They would be like asking “Can God moongoggle tweedledee?” So we shouldn’t say that God cannot do these things, but that they cannot be done. A lot of things are excluded from divine omnipotence not because God doesn’t have the power to do them, but because in their very nature they are not “doable” or possible. As St. Paul says to the Corinthians, “God is not the author of confusion.” You can think about your puzzle this way too. The question “Did God create logic?” is a little bit like the question “Did God create good?” An old paradox called the Euthyphro dilemma, after one of the Socratic dialogues, asks whether God loves the good because it is good, or the good is good because God loves it. Neither alternative seems sound, because the former seems to make good higher than God, but the latter seems to make good arbitrary. The classical solution is that both alternatives are wrong. Both of them make out God and good to be different things, but they are the same thing. God, the uncreated Being, who cannot be other than He is, is identical with His own goodness. He cannot contradict that goodness which is Himself. Now we can approach logic, along with other forms of order, in much the same way. Does God love the order He has placed in things because it is orderly, or did He place it in things because He loves it? The former alternative seems to make order something different than God, something to which He must conform – so that order is above Him. But the latter seems to make it something different than God, something which could have been other than it is – so that, for example, He could have made a world in which the principle of noncontradiction is false. But no, God is identical not only with His own goodness, but with each of His attributes, including the order in the divine Mind. A man or woman can be good without being powerful, or powerful without being orderly, or orderly without being beautiful. But in the final analysis, God’s goodness, power, orderliness, and beauty are identical with each other, and identical with Himself. That doesn’t mean that He is an impersonal abstraction. When one looks all the way into his goodness, or any of His other attributes, one doesn’t find a Something, but a Someone. Here is a third way to untangle the matter. Logical and geometrical relations are examples of “formal necessities” – cases in which the reason for a thing’s necessity results from its form. St. Thomas offers the example that a triangle’s three angles are necessarily equal to two right angles. Today we would qualify this – we would say that a triangle’s three angles are necessarily equal to two right angles in a Euclidean geometry, because we have discovered geometries, such as spherical and hyperbolic, in which this is not the case. Now God could have created a physical space with a geometry other than Euclidean – in fact, as it surprisingly turns out, He has (the one we inhabit!). But He couldn’t have made a triangle’s three angles not be equal to two right angles in a Euclidean geometry, because this is not absolutely possible – a Euclidean space which is not Euclidean is like a man who is not a man but a donkey. Let me offer one more way to think about the puzzle -- and maybe this will be the most helpful. You speculate about how God “thinks,” but we shouldn’t think of Him “thinking” the way we “think.” Finite beings like you and me think of one thing now and another later. When I draw an inference, for example, I begin by thinking of the premises, and then I think of the conclusion. So I am not thinking everything at once – a lot of my thoughts aren’t “actual” but only “potential.” The infinite mind of God isn’t like that, because he doesn’t have any unrealized potentiality. Everything He can be, He is, and everything He can think, He is thinking -- all at once, in an eternal Now. So He doesn’t need to think, “Gee, from this premise, what would follow? Oh, now I see.” In that sense, although the logical orderliness of created things reflects the order of His Mind, He isn’t “following a logic.” If you’re interested, I also discuss questions like these in my new Commentary on Thomas Aquinas’s Treatise on the One God. I hope you keep asking them!
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What Do You Think?Wednesday, 02-26-2025
Yet another “In this house we believe” yard sign has popped up in my neighborhood. They come in waves. There are several variations, but usually the residents assure us that they think “black lives matter,” “women’s rights are human rights,” “no human is illegal,” “science is real,” “love is love,” and “kindness is everything.” What do you think? If by way of neighborly reply, I put this sign in my front yard instead, would my house be burned down?
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Normalized LunacyMonday, 02-24-2025
The exotic ideas I sometimes criticize are not just the fancies of our managerial and opinion-forming classes, as we might like to think. I posted recently – but without explanation, a fault I will rectify now -- that ordinary people who decry the lunacy of our times often accept humdrum versions of the same delusions, even while denying their implications. I notice, for example, that moderates and conservatives who protest lunatic versions of “marriage” such as polyamory quite often believe that cohabitation without vows and with freedom to change partners is equivalent to marriage. Again, moderates and conservatives who would consider it totalitarian to forbid women to stay at home to raise their children commonly view women who do choose that way of life as dim bulbs. And vast numbers of moderates and conservatives who find the ideas I criticize crazy try not to think so because they have internalized the crazy idea that making any judgment about craziness is intolerant. This is one of the reasons why insanity can make way so rapidly, for the knife of the premises has already been slipped quietly between our ribs – and we have slipped it there ourselves. And this is why, even though many of the outré symptoms which ordinary people find so ridiculous, offensive, or baffling – such as men in women’s locker rooms -- will eventually fade, the underlying fallacies are likely to outlive them and produce new symptoms, perhaps equally outré. All too often what we mean in calling ourselves moderate is that we are only moderately lunatic; all too often what we mean in calling ourselves conservative is that although we complain about new craziness, we want to conserve the craziness we have swallowed already.
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Five Conversations with Peter Kreeft on “The Philosophers’ Bench”Thursday, 02-20-2025
I have had five conversations with the renowned Dr. Peter Kreeft of Boston College on his EWTN podcast, "The Philosophers' Bench," and you can listen to them all:
The Differences Between Men and WomenThe Natural LawHuman Conscience and its SourcesThe Virtue of ToleranceThe Nature of Human Happiness
The entire Philosophers’ Bench series can be found here, and I've added a link to our five conversations to this website's Talks page. BY THE WAY:
I'm told that First Things is migrating its archives to a new server. For this reason, many of the links to the older First Things articles and book reviews on my Articles page don't function. Sometime this spring, the problem should be corrected. As you may have noticed, neither the social media links, the "likes" indicator, nor the RSS feed on my website work either. I'm sorry, but I'm not tech-savvy enough to fix them. Some day maybe I will be able to have a new website designed.
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Nietzsche in a Petri DishMonday, 02-17-2025
Query:I've been reading some books about Nietzsche and Nietzschean virtues. Since you're a nihilist-turned-Thomist, how do you now evaluate Nietzsche's list of virtues and his overall concept of virtue? I'm interested in how Thomism can dialogue with Nietzsche on virtue. Also, what were some of the major shifts that you had to make in your own thinking about virtue as you moved from Nietzsche to Christianity and then Catholicism?
Reply:I'm glad to answer, but I’m afraid that Nietzsche doesn’t have a list of virtues, and people who tell you that he does are blowing smoke. What he actually says is that each people has its own “table of values,” its own list of admired qualities: For example, the ancient Persians admired telling the truth and shooting arrows straight. To be sure, Nietzsche himself admires some characteristics, such as strength. But he doesn’t think that there is any objective validity to any of these lists of qualities. If by a virtue one means a quality of character it is objectively good to have, then he doesn’t believe that there are any virtues. In fact, he denies objective truth not only in the moral realm, but in every realm. To him, every doctrine of how things are is a conquest brought about by sheer power, because there is no “how things are.” He claims that thought is only a relation among our drives, that rationality is only a kind of thought we cannot get free of, that conscious intentions are only a kind of symptomology, and that we at in at our best when we are in some sense unconscious. Needless to say, if this were true, then it couldn’t be true. Not even the statement “There is no objective truth” would have objective truth. Dialogue is conversation in mutual pursuit of truth. For someone who doesn’t believe in objective truth, every time we open our mouths we are uttering nonsense, and dialogue is nonsense squared. Thus dialogue with Nietzsche is literally impossible, and there is no point in attempting it. You ask what shifts I had to make in my own thinking about virtue as I emerged from the dark night of nihilism. I would say that the biggest shift was believing again that there can be thinking. The second biggest – though this took longer -- was learning to think again.
His reply:Thank you! That was my hunch. What then do you suppose is the source and motive for the way writers like those I mentioned read Nietzsche? Are they pointing to things that aren't really there? Are they trying to make Nietzsche more palatable by rendering him seem more moderate? Was Nietzsche just inconsistent? Or all of the above?
My further response:Since Nietzsche is so incoherent, it’s easy to read all sorts of things into him. Some people might do that by accident, whether because they don’t read carefully or because they just can’t believe Nietzsche could be as crazy as he is. But careless reading can also be highly motivated. Nihilism thrills a lot of people, who may want Nietzsche to seem less crazy so that they can embrace some version of his lunacy. I’ve written from time to time that if we read Nietzsche at all, we should do so for the same reason we culture diphtheria or dissect hookworms: To study cures. The problem is that some Nietzscheans are engaged in gain-of-function research.
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