The word “philosophy” comes from the Greek words for love of wisdom.  Often, though, what we call philosophy isn’t really love of wisdom, but merely love of unsettling received opinions.  This love is often connected with contempt for any beliefs we can’t give reasons for.

Ah, but there are reasons and reasons.  The sort of reason one has in mind when he demands “Why do you believe so and so?” is a reason for so and so which the other fellow believes with even greater confidence than he believes so and so itself.  But there is a problem with demanding that in every case.

Certainly we can demand it in some cases.  I believe that if two glasses have the same amount of milk, and that if I add the same amount of additional milk to each, then they will still have the same amount of milk.  Why do I believe that they will?  Because equals added to equals are equal.   I am much more confident that equals added to equals are equal, than I am about my perceptions of milk.  Very good.

But why do I believe that I am sitting at my desk, writing about the matter?  Sure, I could give “reasons” of a sort.  I believe that I seem to be doing that.  I believe that I remember sitting down.  I believe that don’t remember getting back up.  But although I am confident of those reasons too, I couldn’t say that I am more confident about them than I am that I am sitting at my desk.  They aren’t that kind of reason.

In fact, I seem more confident of some of my beliefs than I am of any of the reasons I might give for holding them.  For example, I could certainly trace my belief “It’s wrong the twist the baby’s arm” to still deeper premises.  But is that why I believe it?  Probably not.  And that’s okay.  It is wrong.

Matters of common sense which we believe even more than any of the reasons we might give for believing them are sometimes called “Moorean beliefs,” after the late philosopher G.E. Moore, who wrote about them in a famous article entitled “A Defense of Common Sense.”  I happen to be thinking about them today because of a new book by Brian Besong, which defends natural law sexual ethics in terms of Moorean beliefs.

The book, called Sex in Theory, is coming out in August, and I know about it because I was asked for a blurb.  “At the very least,” I wrote, “a good moral theory should be able to explain our most obvious and deeply rooted beliefs and intuitions about right and wrong.  Analytical philosopher Brian Besong convincingly shows that by this test, most theories of the rights and wrongs of sex spectacularly fail the test. Utilitarianism, for example, can’t explain the problem with bestiality, and Kantianism can’t even tell what is right about the natural intercourse of husband and wife. Exactly one theory passes the test:  Natural law.  This book is a truly fine contribution not only to the theory of sexuality, but to the renaissance of the natural law tradition.”

Very interesting.  It’s not an easy read for non-philosophers, but I recommend it.