A chasm is sometimes proposed between so-called virtue ethics and so-called rule or law ethics.  Unless we are thinking of bad theories of ethics, there is no such chasm.

In the first place, every complete theory of moral law requires a theory of virtue.  If I do not have the proper dispositions, the right habits of mind and heart, then how will I recognize true moral rules and distinguish them from false?  For that matter, how will I even be able to apply the rules I know already?  It is one thing to know that I must not steal; it is quite another to see that this would be stealing.  For that I need virtue.

But every complete theory of virtue also requires a theory of moral law.  Even Aristotle, supposed by some to be the paradigm case of a moral philosopher who talked only about virtue and not about law, talks about law.  He holds that the man of practical wisdom acts according to a rational principle; this principle functions as law.  He holds that virtue lies in a mean, but that there is no mean of things like adultery; this implies that there are exceptionless precepts, which also function as law.  He holds that besides the enactments of governments and the customs of peoples there is an unwritten norm to which governments and peoples defer; this norm too is a law.  The awareness of law creeps in through the back door even when it is pushed out the front  -- and Aristotle wasn’t even pushing.